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Abstract 
 
This article explores the gaps left by the Constitutional Court's 
jurisprudence in relation to what the appropriate internal appeal 
mechanism should be at the level of municipalities for the 
approval of building plans. This follows the unanimous judgment 
of the Constitutional Court in City of Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Chairman of the National Building Regulations 
Review Board 2018 5 SA 1 (CC) in which the Court found section 
9 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards 
Act 103 of 1977 (NBR Act), subjecting municipal building 
decisions to appeal by a "Review Board" appointed by the 
Minister of Trade and Industry, to be inconsistent with the 
original constitutional powers of municipalities over planning and 
building regulations. We argue that although the ground for 
holding section 9 of the NBR Act unconstitutional is already 
deeply entrenched in the Court's planning jurisprudence, the 
judgment has left a whopping gap on where prospective/future 
appeals can be lodged and the nature of such an appeal 
mechanism, where municipal officials disapprove building plans 
in terms of section 7 of the NBR Act. It is submitted that the 
invalidation of section 9 by the Court has completely left it up to 
each individual municipality to decide on whether and how an 
internal appeal for the approval of building plans is to be 
pursued. After exploring the options available in terms of other 
local government legislation, we argue that the most appropriate 
way to close the gap left by the Court is for Parliament to enact 
an amendment to the NBR Act providing for an internal appeal 
mechanism that allows for a measure of coherence and 
uniformity across municipalities, and yet respects the autonomy 
of local government. 
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1 Introduction 
In terms of section 156(1)(a) and Schedule 4B of the Constitution of the 
Republic of South Africa, 1996 (hereafter, the Constitution) municipalities 
have original legislative and executive powers over building regulations. 
These powers are closely linked to their planning powers that also appear 
in Schedule 4B of the Constitution. National and provincial governments 
have legislative and executive powers to ensure that municipalities 
effectively perform their original powers and functions by regulating their 
executive authority as defined in section 156(1) of the Constitution.1 The 
Constitutional Court recently held that the regulatory powers of national and 
provincial governments in this context are limited to creating norms and 
guidelines for the exercise of a municipal power or for the performance of a 
municipal function and do not allow national or provincial governments to 
usurp the original power or perform the original function of a municipality.2 
This means setting broad norms and standards in which context 
municipalities can effectively exercise their original powers and functions. It 
is important to note that the original constitutional powers of municipalities 
over building regulations are regulated by national legislation which 
predates the Constitution - the National Building Regulations and Building 
Standards Act 103 of 1977 (NBR Act). 
In this article we use the unanimous judgment of the Constitutional Court in 
City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the National 
Building Regulations Review Board 2018 5 SA 1 (CC) (hereafter CoJ 
Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board) as a 
spring-board to discuss and propose an appropriate appeal mechanism for 
decisions on the approval of building plans made at local government level 
under the NBR Act. The Court found section 9 of the NBR Act, which 
provided an internal appeal mechanism for the approval of building plans 
created and staffed at a national government level, inconsistent with the 
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1  See ss 155(6)-(7) of the Constitution. 
2  Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs and Development Planning, 
Western Cape v The Habitat Council; Minister of Local Government, Environmental 
Affairs and Development Planning, Western Cape v City of Cape Town 2014 4 SA 
437 (CC) (Minister of Local Government v The Habitat Council) para 22. See Fuo 
2017 De Jure 328-331. 
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original constitutional powers of municipalities over building regulations.3 
We argue that although the ground for holding section 9 of the NBR Act 
unconstitutional is already deeply entrenched in the Court's planning 
jurisprudence,4 the judgment has left a gap in the regulation of where 
prospective/future appeals can be lodged and the nature of such an appeal 
mechanism, where municipal officials disapprove building plans in terms of 
section 7 of the NBR Act.5 We begin in Parts 2 and 3 of this paper by giving 
a synopsis of the jurisprudence of the Constitutional Court on the original 
powers of municipalities regarding building regulations and municipal 
planning and how these powers were violated by national legislation, 
resulting in the invalidation of provisions of such national legislation. In Part 
4 we discuss the character and work of the National Building Regulations 
Review Board that was prescribed in section 9 of the NBR Act, and is now 
discontinued after section 9 was declared unconstitutional. In Part 5 we 
discuss the general character of internal appeals in the South African 
context. In exploring what internal appeal mechanism would be appropriate 
for future decisions on building plans, in Part 6 we compare the erstwhile 
section 9 of the NBR Act with internal appeal mechanisms provided in 
section 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 
(Systems Act) and the more recent appeal mechanism developed in the 
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA). 
This, with a view to determining which existing features could usefully inform 
the creation of an internal appeal mechanism fitting for decisions on building 
                                            
3  Section 9 of the National Building Regulations and Building Standards Act 103 of 
1977 (the NBR Act) provided: 
"Appeal against decision of local authority 
(1) Any person who- 
(a) feels aggrieved by the refusal of a local authority to grant approval referred to 
in section 7 in respect of the erection of a building; 
(b) feels aggrieved by any notice of prohibition referred to in section 10; or 
(c) disputes the interpretation or application by a local authority of any national 
building regulation or any other building regulation or by-law, 
may, within the period, in the manner and upon payment of the fees prescribed 
by regulation, appeal to a review board. 
(2) The review board referred to in subsection (1) shall consist of- 
(a) a chairman designated by the Minister [of Trade and Industry]; and 
(b) two persons appointed for the purpose of any particular appeal by the said 
chairman from persons whose names are on a list compiled in the manner 
prescribed by regulation." 
4  See City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development 
Tribunal 2010 6 SA 182 (CC) (CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng 
Development Tribunal) para 57; Minister of Local Government, Environmental Affairs 
and Development Planning of the Western Cape v Lagoonbay Lifestyle Estate (Pty) 
Ltd 2014 1 SA 521 (CC) para 46; Minister of Local Government v The Habitat Council 
paras 13-19. 
5  This same question was raised rhetorically by Justice O'Regan in Walele v City of 
Cape Town 2008 6 SA 129 (CC) paras 141-142. 
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plans. In Part 7 we express an opinion on what the current position is on 
internal appeal mechanisms for the approval of building plans before we 
make recommendations on legislative interventions that could be made and 
what ought to inform such interventions. Here we argue that the invalidation 
of section 9 has completely left it up to each individual municipality to decide 
on whether and how internal appeals in respect of the approval of building 
plans shall be pursued. As will become evident from the discussion below, 
we argue that there could be drawbacks to this fragmented approach, which 
might lead to a lack of coherence and uniformity in the adjudication of 
appeals of decisions on building plans. Such incoherence and lack of 
uniformity has for characterised the debate on efficiency of internal 
administrative appeal mechanisms in South Africa for long time. We argue 
that the most appropriate way to close the gap left by the Constitutional 
Court in CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review 
Board is for Parliament to enact an amendment to the NBR Act providing 
for an internal appeal mechanism, thus allowing for a measure of coherence 
and uniformity across municipalities yet respecting the autonomy of local 
government. We make concluding remarks in Part 8.  
2  Background: CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman 
of the NBR Review Board 
2.1 Facts of the case 
In terms of the NBR Act, the construction of buildings in a municipal area 
must be subject to prior approval of the building plans by the relevant 
municipality and any construction of a building without the necessary 
municipal approval constitutes a criminal offence which is punishable by a 
fine in terms of section 4(4).6 Subject to the relevant provisions of the Act, a 
municipality is empowered to approve or disapprove the building plans upon 
recommendation by its building control officer.7 The Act does not prescribe 
who within the municipality must make the final decision on building plans 
pursuant to the building control officer's recommendation. In terms of 
section 9 of the NBR Act, read with the National Building Regulations8 and 
the Review Board Regulations,9 applicants dissatisfied with the non-
                                            
6  See ss 4 and 7 of the NBR Act. The term "building" is defined very broadly in s 1 of 
the Act to include permanent or temporary structures used for rendering any service 
– this will include cellular phone masts. 
7  The powers of municipalities to appoint building control officers and their functions 
are outlined in ss 4-5 of the Act. 
8  GN R2378 in GG 12780 of 12 October 1990 (National Building Regulations). 
9  GN 2074 in GG 9927 of 13 September 1985 (Review Board Regulations). 
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approval of their building plans by a municipality were allowed to appeal to 
a Review Board, which was constituted by three persons, one of whom was 
a chairman appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry.10 In terms of 
these arrangements, the Review Board exercised appellate jurisdiction over 
the application of municipal by-laws, policies and decisions on building 
regulations.11 
In view of its constitutional powers over building regulations, the City of 
Johannesburg adopted the City of Johannesburg Cellular Mast Policy12 in 
order to govern applications for building plans relating to the erection of 
cellular phone mast (communication towers) in its area of jurisdiction.13 The 
Mast Policy provides that applications of this kind will be determined in 
terms of section 7 of the NBR Act.14 The Cellular Mast Policy outlines the 
process that should be followed for submitting plans for approval and 
accords owners of property adjacent to where the mast is to be erected a 
hearing before the decision to approve is taken. These land owners may 
submit their written representations to the City within 21 days of being 
requested to do so. 
In June 2012 ATC South Africa Wireless Infrastructure (Pty) Ltd submitted 
to the City an application for the approval of plans to erect a cellular mast 
on its property. In line with its Policy, the City gave the relevant adjacent 
property owners an opportunity to make representations on the application. 
Although two of them objected to the erection of the mast, the City approved 
the plans and the mast was erected on ATC's property. Dissatisfied by the 
approval, in  2013the objectors lodged an appeal with the Review Board 
against the decision of the City.15 Before the Review Board, the City argued 
mainly that the Board should dismiss the application on the ground that it 
had no jurisdiction over the matter. The City's argument therefore did not 
address the merits of the appeal. After considering written submissions, the 
Review Board issued a ruling in 2015 rejecting the City's arguments. In its 
ruling, the Review Board ordered the City to submit its response to the 
factual arguments and merits of the appeal within 21 days, subsequent to 
which the appellants in the matter would be provided an opportunity to 
                                            
10  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the National Building 
Regulations Review Board 2018 5 SA 1 (CC) (CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v 
Chairman of the NBR Review Board) paras 5-7. 
11  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 6-7. 
12  See City of Johannesburg Date Unknown http://www.joburgtourism.com/ 
files/useruploads/user_anon/files/apps_cellmast.pdf. 
13  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 8. 
14  See ss 7(1), (3)-(7) of the NBR Act for details. 
15  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 9. 
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reply.16 Unhappy with the ruling, the City instituted proceedings in the High 
Court seeking an order declaring section 9 of the Act invalid and 
unconstitutional to the extent that it authorised the Review Board to usurp a 
municipal function and asked for the Board's ruling to be set aside. The City 
argued that section 9 of the Act empowered an organ of state in the national 
sphere of government to exercise powers which the Constitution reserved 
exclusively for municipalities.17 
Based on a number of cases decided by the Constitutional Court,18 the High 
Court held that section 9 of the NBR Act was inconsistent with the 
Constitution because it impermissibly authorised the Review Board to 
exercise the planning functions of municipalities.19 The High Court declared 
section 9 of the Act invalid and set aside the decision of the Review Board. 
It declared the appeal that was pending before the Review Board void ab 
initio. As required by the Constitution, the High Court's order declaring 
section 9 of the Act constitutionally invalid and of no force and effect had to 
be confirmed by the Constitutional Court.20 
2.2 Main decision and remedy 
In a unanimous judgment written by Justice Jafta, the Constitutional Court 
held that the High Court was correct in concluding that section 9 of the NBR 
Act was inconsistent with the Constitution and accordingly confirmed the 
declaration of invalidity.21 The Constitutional Court's decision was based on 
how the Constitution protects the autonomy of local government vis-à-vis 
the other spheres of government and how this gives effect to the principle 
of the separation of powers among three spheres of government.22 The 
Court indicated that, in terms of section 156(1) read with Schedule 4B of the 
Constitution, municipal planning and building regulations are exclusive 
executive competencies of municipalities.23 The Court indicated that when 
the City approved ATC's building plans to erect a cellular phone mast on its 
property, the City was exercising its constitutional powers pertaining to 
building regulations and municipal planning.24 The Court observed that 
                                            
16  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 10-11. 
17  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 13. 
18  See CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal; Minister of 
Local Government v The Habitat Council; Tronox KZN Sands (Pty) Ltd v KwaZulu-
Natal Planning and Development Appeal Tribunal 2016 3 SA 160 (CC). 
19  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 16. 
20  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 18-19. 
21  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 38. 
22  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 20-38. 
23  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 23-24. 
24  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 25. 
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although national and provincial governments enjoy legislative authority 
over matters entrusted to the local sphere, the Constitution does not 
empower these spheres to exercise the executive authority of 
municipalities. The Court indicated that the role played by the national 
sphere in municipal affairs is restricted to regulating the exercise of power 
by municipalities and capacitating municipalities to manage their own affairs 
through regulating how this must be done. The regulatory power of national 
government does not mean that it may by itself take over and exercise the 
executive authority of a municipality.25 The Court asserted that there "is no 
constitutional provision that allows a member of Cabinet to intervene in the 
exercise of constitutional powers by municipalities. This intervention is at 
odds with the separation of powers created by the constitutional scheme 
mentioned earlier."26 The Court indicated that although there is a general 
exception in section 139 of the Constitution, the intervention in the case 
before it was not "concerned with an intervention of that kind. Instead, we 
are dealing with interference by the Minister and the Board who belong to 
the national sphere of government."27 The Court asserted that:  
The legislative power that the national and provincial spheres exercise over 
functional areas allocated to the local sphere does not include the power to 
arrogate to themselves executive powers vested in the local sphere by the 
Constitution. The exercise of the executive authority of municipalities is the 
sole preserve of municipalities…The fact that section 9 of the Act empowers 
the Minister and the Board to intervene on appeal does not change the 
position to a constitutionally compliant one. And certainly, what is authorised 
by the impugned provision goes beyond the power of regulating the exercise 
by municipalities of their executive authority referred to in section 156(1). The 
Board may reverse the decision of a municipality. This override is not a 
decision of a municipality but of the Board.28 
Based on the above reasoning and its jurisprudence in previous cases, the 
Court concluded that the High Court was right in concluding that section 9 
of the Act was inconsistent with the Constitution and upheld the declaration 
of invalidity.29 One can argue that this approach was inevitable given the 
Court's earlier ruling in Minister of Local Government v The Habitat Council, 
where it found that a "full-blown" appellate jurisdiction by a provincial 
authority on a municipal planning matter (a power bestowed on local 
government under Schedule 4(B), read with section 156(1), of the 
                                            
25  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 34 and 
35. 
26  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 26. 
27  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 27. 
28  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 35-36. 
29  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 38. 
N RABOSHAKGA & O FUO  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  8 
Constitution) was constitutionally impermissible and that the executive 
authority of such matters belonged to municipalities "alone".30 
In terms of remedy, the Court accepted as sensible the proposal by the City 
of Johannesburg that the order of invalidity should operate prospectively 
and that it should not affect pending appeals — the processing of pending 
appeals should not be disrupted but finalised without delay by a Review 
Board constituted in terms of section 9 of the Act.31 However, the Court 
rejected the City's proposal that future appeals should be processed in 
terms of section 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 
2000.32 The Court held that: 
                                            
30  Minister of Local Government v The Habitat Council para 16. It had also been 
observed by Fuo that: "A cogent principle distilled from the jurisprudence of the Court 
emanating from the cases in the area of planning law is that a decision taken by a 
municipality pursuant to powers protected in its exclusive area of constitutional 
competence cannot be subjected to appeal to a functionary or entity operating within 
the national or provincial sphere of government. This also means that legislation, 
executive policies or regulations cannot subject such decisions to appeal at the 
national or provincial level. Doing so would violate the constitutional vision of 
autonomous spheres of government which dictates that national and provincial 
spheres of government not be entitled to usurp the exclusive constitutional powers 
and functions of municipalities, barring exceptional circumstances." Fuo 2017 De 
Jure 345. 
31  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 40 and 
43. 
32  Section 62 of the Local Government: Municipal Systems Act 32 of 2000 (the Systems 
Act) reads as follows: 
"(1) A person whose rights are affected by a decision taken by a political structure,   
 political office bearer, councillor or staff member of a municipality in terms of a    
 power or duty delegated or sub-delegated by a delegating authority to the  
 political structure, political office bearer, councillor or staff member, may appeal  
 against that decision by giving written notice of the appeal and reasons to the  
 municipal manager within 21 days of the date of the notification of the decision. 
(2) The municipal manager must promptly submit the appeal to the appropriate   
 appeal authority mentioned in subsection (4). 
(3) The appeal authority must consider the appeal, and confirm, vary or revoke the 
decision, but no such variation or revocation of a decision may not detract from 
any rights that may have accrued as a result of the decision. 
(4) When the appeal is against a decision taken by – 
(a) a staff member other than the municipal manager, the municipal manager is 
the appeal authority; 
(b) the municipal manager, the executive committee or executive mayor is the 
appeal authority, or, if the municipality does not have an executive committee 
or an executive mayor, the council of the municipality is the appeal authority; 
or 
(c) a political structure or political office bearer, or a councillor – 
(i)  the municipal council is the appeal authority where the council comprises 
more than 15 councillors or 
(ii)  or a committee of councillors who were not in the decision and appointed by 
the municipal council for this purpose is the appeal authority where the council 
comprises of more than 14 councillors. 
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This section is simply not suitable. Decisions to which section 9 of the Act 
applied are those which were taken by a municipality. Under section 62(4) of 
the Systems Act, a municipal council is the highest appeal authority. 
Therefore, if section 62 were to apply, a municipality would sit on appeal 
against its own decisions. This would be an untenable situation.33 
Consequently, it is just and equitable to have pending appeals processed in 
terms of section 9 of the Act. But this process must exclude the appeal lodged 
in the present matter. The High Court declared that appeal to have been void 
and its order was not challenged before this Court.34 
In brief, the Court confirmed that section 9 of the NBR Act was invalid to the 
extent that it empowers the National Building Regulations Review Board to 
exercise appellate powers over decisions of a municipality on building plans. 
3 Background: Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v 
Gauteng Development Tribunal and the enactment of 
SPLUMA  
Prior to 1995 the Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986 
empowered "authorised" municipalities in what was then the Transvaal 
province to make decisions on the rezoning of land and township 
development. The City of Johannesburg was such an authorised 
municipality. After 1995 the Gauteng Provincial Government set up the 
Gauteng Development Tribunal in terms of chapters V and VI of the 
Development Facilitation Act 67 of 1995 (DFA). The latter Act empowered 
provincial governments to set up tribunals which would consider and decide 
on applications for rezoning and township development, effectively taking 
away the jurisdiction "authorised" municipalities in Gauteng had under the 
Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance to make final decisions on such 
applications.  
Pursuant to disagreements between the City of Johannesburg and the 
Tribunal on the manner in which the Tribunal approached the approval of 
applications for rezoning and township development, the City of 
Johannesburg applied to court for an order declaring unconstitutional 
chapters V and VI of the DFA, arguing that the Act violated the 
constitutionally-enshrined autonomy of local government to approve 
applications on rezoning and township development. The South Gauteng 
High Court dismissed the application but granted the City leave to appeal to 
                                            
(5)  An appeal authority must commence with an appeal within six weeks and 
decide the appeal within a reasonable period. 
(6)  The provisions of this section do not detract from any appropriate appeal 
procedure provided for in any other applicable law." 
33  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 41. 
34  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 42. 
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the Supreme Court of Appeal.35 The Supreme Court of Appeal found in 
favour of the City of Johannesburg, holding that chapters V and VI of the 
DFA were unconstitutional and invalid.36 
The Constitutional Court confirmed the declaration of unconstitutionality. It 
held that in terms of section 156(1) read with Schedule 4(B) of the 
Constitution only municipalities were empowered to make decisions on the 
approval of rezoning and township development applications. The Court 
reasoned that in terms of the constitutional scheme the only circumstances 
where provincial governments could intervene in the affairs of local 
government were: (a) the temporary takeover of municipal powers in terms 
of section 139 of the Constitution in exceptional circumstances; (b) 
provincial governments monitoring and supporting municipalities in terms of 
sections 155(6)(a) of the Constitution; and (c) national and provincial 
governments regulating the exercise by municipalities of their executive 
authority in order to ensure effective performance by municipalities of their 
functions in terms of section 155(7) of the Constitution — which power is 
limited to setting broad norms and guidelines for application by 
municipalities.37 The Court suspended the order of invalidity for 24 months 
to allow Parliament to rectify the defects in the Act or to pass new 
legislation.38 
For the purposes of this article, the most significant development of the 
Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 
case was the development and enactment of the legislation to replace 
chapters V and VI of the DFA, which had been declared unconstitutional. 
Instead of Parliament’s just remedying the defects, the DFA was overhauled 
and ultimately repealed and replaced with SPLUMA. In the development of 
SPLUMA everything was on the cards, including what the appeal 
mechanism for rezoning and township development decisions within 
municipalities should be.  
This background is given in order to determine how the approach in 
SPLUMA can inform what the appropriate appeal mechanism should be for 
the approval of building plans. We discuss the nature of the appeal 
mechanism developed in SPLUMA in Part 5 of this article. Suffice it to say, 
                                            
35  City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 
2008 4 SA 572 (W). 
36 City of Johannesburg Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal 
2010 2 SA 554 (SCA). 
37  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal paras 43 and 46. 
Also see Minister of Local Government v The Habitat Council para 22. 
38  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal paras 79 and 95. 
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for now, that SPLUMA locates the power to make decisions on rezoning and 
township development with a Municipal Planning Tribunal staffed with 
municipal officials and external experts. The authority to hear internal 
appeals is located with the executive authority of the municipality 
concerned, although this power can also be delegated elsewhere. At the 
centre of who should make approvals and hear internal appeals in the 
development of SPLUMA were considerations of the autonomy of local 
government. 
Before providing an analysis of the impact of the declaration of section 9 of 
the NBR Act as unconstitutional, we find it useful to set out the nature of the 
now defunct National Building Regulations Review Board, how it operated, 
and the importance of internal appeals in the South African context. 
4 The nature of the National Building Regulations Review 
Board and its operations 
Section 20(1) of the NBR Act empowers the Minister of Trade and Industry 
to make regulations pertaining to the work of the Review Board. The Review 
Board Regulations39 were promulgated in 1985. The Regulations provide 
the Director-General of the Department of Trade and Industry with 
discretionary authority to appoint and unappoint members of the Review 
Board, guided by the need to ensure that various branches of the 
construction industry are represented on the board. Various organisations 
involved in the construction industry may nominate candidates to the 
Director-General.40 The chairman of the Review Board is designated by the 
Minister in terms of section 9(2)(a) of the NBR Act. The list of members of 
the Review Board must be kept transparent.41 
The Regulations provide an elaborate procedure for appeals to the Review 
Board. If a matter is complex the Board is empowered to set it down for a 
hearing where witnesses can be summoned and compelled to give 
evidence under oath.42 Legal representation and inspections in loco are also 
permitted.43 Failure by a witness to comply with a summons is deemed to 
be a criminal offence.44 The Regulations also contain measures for avoiding 
conflicts of interest by members of the Review Board.45 Appeal decisions 
                                            
39  GN 2074 in GG 9927 of 13 September 1985 (Review Board Regulations). 
40  Regulations 2-6 and 8 of the Review Board Regulations. 
41  Regulation 7 of the Review Board Regulations. 
42  Regulations 11 and 12(4) of the Review Board Regulations.  
43  Regulation 12 of the Review Board Regulations. 
44  Regulation 11(2)(a) of the Review Board Regulations. 
45  Regulation 11(3) of the Review Board Regulations. 
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are taken by a majority vote of the three-member panel, which may dismiss 
the appeal, confirm the refusal, grant conditional approval or uphold the 
appeal in whole or in part.46 The panel may also order compensation.47 A 
record of proceedings must be kept in safe custody and be transparent and 
accessible.48 
The work of the Review Board is administered by the National Regulator for 
Compulsory Specifications (NRCS), which inter alia has a mandate to assist 
and advise the Minister of Trade and Industry in giving effect to the 
objectives of the NBR Act and the National Building Regulations.49 The 
Director-General of the Department of Trade and Industry is empowered to 
delegate to the staff of the NRCS his or her powers in terms of the Review 
Board Regulations.50 Indeed, the Minister relied on the NRCS to coordinate 
the work of the Review Board.51 
We reviewed five decisions of the Review Board available on the NRCS 
website.52 These decisions reveal a number of features about the Review 
Board which are worth noting: (a) the chairperson and members of the 
Board in each instance were experts in construction, law and/or dispute 
resolution;53 (b) the judgments were written in a similar manner to 
court/arbitration judgments, referring both to legislative provisions and case 
law; (c) the analysis and application that had to be made involved the 
interpretation of legal provisions;54 (d) evidence presented (including that of 
expert witnesses) had to be analysed and applied to the relevant 
                                            
46  Regulation 13 of the Review Board Regulations. 
47  Regulation 13 of the Review Board Regulations. 
48  Regulation 16 of the Review Board Regulations. 
49  See the NBR Act generally, the National Regulator for Compulsory Specifications 
Act 5 of 2008 and NRCS 2019 https://www.nrcs.org.za/content_main.asp?menu 
ID=12. 
50  Regulation 17 of the Review Board Regulations. 
51  See NRCS 2019 https://www.nrcs.org.za/content_main.asp?menuID=12. 
52  See NRCS 2019 https://www.nrcs.org.za/content.asp?subID=4151#1. The following 
decisions were reviewed: Byron Janse Van Rensburg v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan 
Municipality (23 March 2015); LKJ Fire Engineering Consultant v Nelson Mandela 
Bay Municipality (22 February 2017); Mediclinic Southern Africa (Pty) Ltd v 
Ekurhuleni Municipality (24 August 2015); Misty Sea Trading 339 (Pty) Ltd v City of 
Cape Town Municipality (14 November 2016); and Rowmoor Investments 156 (Pty) 
Ltd v City of Cape Town Municipality (8 November 2016). 
53  In the decisions reviewed the chairman was either Michael Bester or Ntando 
Ndonga. Michael Bester's profile indicates that he is an architect with extensive 
experience in dispute resolution, commercial mediation and arbitration. Ntando 
Ndonga is an expert and executive working in the legal, risk and governance sectors. 
54  In this regard, it is telling that s 9(1)(c) of the NBR Act provided that anyone who 
"disputes the interpretation or application by a local authority of any national building 
regulation or any other building regulation or by-law" had the right to appeal to the 
review board. 
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regulations; (e) adjudication of the complaints needed technical expertise in 
the construction and engineering environments;55 and (f) administrative law 
principles such as rationality, reasonableness, failure to apply the mind, 
authority and lawfulness had to be applied. 
If anything, the role that has been played by the Review Board exposes the 
importance of experts making appeal decisions on matters pertaining to the 
NBR Act. We have not found any indication that the system of a review 
board made up of experts was unsuitable for decisions pertaining to the 
regulation of building, with the exception that in the present instance it 
violated the autonomy of local government, as found in CoJ Metropolitan 
Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board. Indeed, the violation of 
the autonomy of local government was the only criticism leveled against the 
system of a review board by the Constitutional Court. It would thus be fitting 
to consider whether the features of the Review Board established under 
section 9 of the NBR Act could be retained in any replacement internal 
appeal mechanism for decisions made under the NBR Act whilst curing the 
defect of violating the autonomy of local government. 
5 General character and importance of internal appeals in 
the South African context 
An internal appeal in the context of decisions made under the NBR Act is 
one contemplated in section 7(2)(a) of the Promotion of Administrative 
Justice Act 3 of 2000 (PAJA) which provides that: "no court or tribunal shall 
review an administrative action in terms of this Act unless any internal 
remedy provided for in any other law has first been exhausted [unless a 
court or tribunal deems an exemption to be in the interest of justice]". An 
administrative decision56 is valid until set aside either by the administrative 
body or by a court or tribunal on review.57 An internal appeal allows for the 
reconsideration of a decision of someone within an administrative body by 
someone belonging to or acting at the behest of that administrative body or 
                                            
55  For example, in Byron Janse Van Rensburg v Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality 
the Board remarked that "whether the building complies with [the] constraints [of the 
applicable town planning scheme] or not is a matter of empirical fact and not one 
that lies within the discretion of [municipal] officials." 
56  Decisions on building plans fall within the purview of the definition of administrative 
action as defined in s 1 of the Promotion of Administrative Justice Act 3 of 2000 
(PAJA). 
57  See Georgiou v Nelson Mandela Bay Metropolitan Municipality 2016 4 All SA 524 
(ECP); Oudekraal Estates (Pty) Ltd v City of Cape Town 2004 6 SA 222 (SCA) para 
26; and MEC for Health, Eastern Cape v Kirland Investments (Pty) Ltd 2014 3 SA 
481 (CC) paras 100-101. 
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belonging to or at the behest of a body hierarchically higher than the 
administrative body that made the initial decision — in terms of any 
applicable legislation and the internal mechanisms of the administrative 
body concerned.58 Where no law exists permitting an internal appeal, it is 
deemed that there is no internal appeal mechanism applicable to decisions 
of the administrative body concerned. Accordingly, in South Africa there is 
no right to an internal remedy nor is there an obligation on an administrative 
body to apply an internal remedy where there is no specific law giving 
internal remedial power to that administrative body.59 On internal appeal, 
both the merits of the initial decision and the manner in which it was made 
can be reconsidered. 
Counted amongst the advantages of internal appeal mechanisms are that 
they provide an accessible, cheaper, quicker and "democratically less 
threatening" platform. They also allow for the reconsideration of decisions 
that are technical, practical, of a policy nature and often specialised to be 
made by experts and people who work on such matters more regularly.60 
Such administrators and experts also tend to have easier access to the 
relevant facts and information.61 
Quinot et al caution that these advantages "depend largely on how the 
particular mechanism is set up in the legislation and (as with all regulatory 
mechanisms) how it is implemented."62 Hoexter cautions that although 
advantages of speed, efficiency and expertise exist in older and more 
established administrative systems, in some areas of the administration 
appeal processes have broken down "completely".63 It is for this reason that 
the consideration of a replacement of the internal appeal mechanism for 
decisions made under the NBR Act must be focussed on finding or 
                                            
58  As Hoexter points out, an administrative appeal "enables the reconsideration of an 
administrative decision by a higher authority" and the "person or body to whom the 
appeal is made will step into the shoes of the original decision-maker, as it were, and 
decide the matter anew." Hoexter Administrative Law 65. 
59  Quinot et al Administrative Justice 100. 
60  See Quinot et al Administrative Justice 102; Hoexter Administrative Law 66; Hoexter 
2000 SALJ 497; Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 2010 4 SA 327 (CC) para 37. 
The Court in para 35 said: "Internal remedies are designed to provide immediate and 
cost-effective relief, giving the executive the opportunity to utilise its own 
mechanisms, rectifying irregularities first, before aggrieved parties resort to litigation. 
Although courts play a vital role in providing litigants with access to justice, the 
importance of more readily available and cost-effective internal remedies cannot be 
gainsaid." 
61  Koyabe v Minister for Home Affairs 2010 4 SA 327 (CC) para 37. 
62  Quinot et al Administrative Justice 102. 
63  Hoexter Administrative Law 66. 
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developing an internal appeal mechanism which achieves the advantages 
of internal administrative appeals. 
Scholars of administrative law have identified that a major shortcoming in 
internal administrative appeal mechanisms in South Africa is the lack of 
uniformity and coherence.64 Referring to an earlier quote by Baxter, 
Govender observes that South Africa had "a disparate collection of appeal 
bodies with vastly differing modes of operation, and consequently different 
levels of effectiveness."65 The incoherence of internal administrative appeal 
mechanisms in South Africa was recognised as early as in 1992 when the 
South African Law (Reform) Commission investigated courts' powers to 
review administrative acts.66 To date, however, the incoherence and lack of 
uniformity persist. Both Hoexter and Quinot et al point to the creation of 
appeal tribunal[s] with multiple jurisdictions over appeals from a variety of 
organs of state — akin to the Australian Administrative Appeals Tribunal — 
as a possible solution to the problem of the "fragmented South African 
internal remedies landscape".67  
In this article we do not argue that there needs to be a single internal appeal 
mechanism for all decisions of administrative bodies, but for the principle 
that there needs to be a respectable measure of uniformity and coherence 
in the manner in which comparable internal appeal mechanisms work and, 
in particular, that there are demonstrable benefits in reducing the 
fragmentation of internal appeal mechanisms in building plan decisions in 
the local government sphere. Interestingly, under section 9 of the NBR Act 
the now defunct Review Board was a type of an appeal tribunal which had 
jurisdiction over decisions made in all municipalities in the country in terms 
of the NBR Act. However, for the reason that municipalities were not 
involved in the appointment of members of the Review Board, the appeal 
mechanism in section 9 of the Act was declared unconstitutional. It follows 
that an appeal tribunal of the Australian Appeal Tribunal type with 
jurisdiction over building plan decisions in all municipalities, even if it could 
be established in South Africa, would still run the risk of being found to 
violate local government autonomy and thus be susceptible to being found 
constitutionally invalid. Accordingly, whatever solution is found to the need 
to replace the appeal mechanism under section 9 of the NBR Act, issues of 
                                            
64  See Quinot et al Administrative Justice 101-102; Hoexter Administrative Law 70-72; 
Hoexter 2000 SALJ 484. 
65  Govender "Administrative Appeals Tribunals" 83. Also quoted by Hoexter 
Administrative Law 70. 
66  SALC Project 24 50. 
67  Quinot et al Administrative Justice 101; Hoexter Administrative Law 71. 
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incoherence and lack of uniformity would still have to be resolved whilst 
allowing each municipality the autonomy to have its own internal appeal 
structure. 
6 Comparison among the internal appeal mechanisms in 
section 9 of the NBR Act, section 62 of the Systems Act 
and section 51 of SPLUMA 
The erstwhile section 9 of the NBR Act, section 51 of SPLUMA and section 
62 of the Systems Act provide internal appeal mechanisms which are worth 
comparing if we are to learn anything from developments that have taken 
place since the dawn of democracy in respect of internal appeals in the 
context of decisions of municipalities. Like the demise of the appeal 
mechanism under the NBR Act, the making of an internal appeal 
mechanism in SPLUMA was necessitated by the need to protect the 
autonomy of municipalities from undue interference by the national and/or 
provincial spheres of government. Thus the consideration of SPLUMA is 
inescapable in thinking about the type of appeal mechanism that would be 
suitable for appeals on municipal decisions concerning building plans. The 
need to consider section 62 of the Systems Act is equally inescapable as it 
was designed as a type of catch-all internal appeal mechanism for all 
decision-making in municipalities where no other law provided for an area-
specific internal appeal mechanism.68 We compare the internal appeal 
provisions in these three statutes for the purposes of this article in order to 
identify all of the factors that need to be considered in deciding on an 
appropriate appeal mechanism in relation to building plans, following the 
declaration of section 9 of the NBR Act as unconstitutional. We compare 
these provisions in terms of the following aspects: appeal against whom; 
appeal by whom and for whose benefit; who is the appeal authority; and 
overlaps. 
6.1 Appeal against whom? 
The NBR Act provided for "appeal against decision of local authority"; the 
Systems Act against "a decision taken by a political structure, political office 
bearer, councillor or staff member of a municipality"; and SPLUMA against 
"a decision taken by a Municipal Planning Tribunal".69 Therefore, the first 
                                            
68  It should be noted that s 62(6) of the Systems Act has the effect that the latter will 
not apply where there exists legislation that provides for an internal appeal process 
for particular decisions by or within municipalities. 
69  Sections 9 of the NBR Act (the heading), 62(1) of the Systems Act and 51(1) of the 
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management Act 16 of 2013 (SPLUMA). 
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point of difference is that the NBR Act provided the power to approve 
building plans to the "local authority" without specifying who within the local 
authority must take the decision to approve building plans. Hence section 9 
of the Act provided for an appeal against whomever the local authority has 
elected to make final decisions on building plans. The building control officer 
merely makes recommendations to the local authority.70 
SPLUMA allocates the power to make decisions on applications for land 
use to a specialised Municipal Planning Tribunal (MPT). An MPT is 
composed of "officials in the full-time service of the municipality" as well as 
"persons appointed by the municipal council who are not municipal officials 
and who have knowledge and experience of spatial planning, land use 
management and land development or the law related thereto."71 Municipal 
councillors may not be appointed as members of an MPT.72 Thus, under 
SPLUMA, an internal appeal will be against the decision made by the MPT. 
Section 62 of the Systems Act, on the other hand, is a general provision for 
appeals against decisions of anyone in the municipality, as long as the 
person was authorised by law to make such decision. 
6.2 Appeal by whom and for whose benefit? 
Section 9(2) of the NBR Act provided that anyone who was aggrieved by a 
decision of the local authority or who disputed the manner in which the local 
authority had interpreted a provision of the Act, a national building regulation 
or by-law, might appeal a decision of the local authority. The Supreme Court 
of Appeal has interpreted this provision to mean that it is available only to 
"persons who have applied unsuccessfully for approval for the erection of a 
building or have been prohibited from either commencing or continuing with 
building operations."73 In other words, third parties who had not objected to 
the decision of the local authority could not appeal to the Review Board. The 
Court went on to say:  
How can a person appeal against a decision taken in proceedings in which he 
or she was not a party? The essence of an appeal is a rehearing (whether 
                                            
70  Section 7 of the NBR Act provides that a local authority must consider the 
recommendation of the building control officer and then decide on whether to grant 
the approval or refuse to grant the approval of the building plans. 
71  Section 36(1) of SPLUMA. 
72  Section 36(2) of SPLUMA. 
73  JDJ Properties CC v Umngeni Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 395 (SCA) para 42. 
N RABOSHAKGA & O FUO  PER / PELJ 2020 (23)  18 
wide or narrow) by a court or tribunal of second instance. Implicit in this is that 
the rehearing is at the instance of an unsuccessful participant in a process.74 
Accordingly, the NBR Act provided what could be termed a narrow appeal 
not available to third parties who are affected by the decision of the 
municipality but who had not previously made an unsuccessful application 
to the municipality or lodged an objection with the municipality. 
Section 62 of the Systems Act has also been interpreted similarly; it is 
available only to a person who had applied unsuccessfully to the 
municipality. It provides that "a person whose rights are affected by a 
decision" may appeal against such a decision. The Supreme Court Appeal 
has said that: 
It seems plain that the purpose of s 62 as a whole is to give to the dissatisfied 
applicant for permission – and to no one else – an opportunity for the matter 
to be reheard by a higher authority within the municipality. It is only the 
aggrieved applicant, who has failed to secure the permission sought in his or 
her application, who is afforded a right of appeal under s 62…. Section 62 thus 
grants no viable appeal at all to a person not party to the [application to the 
municipality] … [N]eighbours ... who are not party to an application or an 
objection to the grant of permission to act by a municipality – are not afforded 
an appeal under s 62.75 
Section 62(3) also contains a proviso that a section 62 appeal is available 
only where rights have not accrued as a result of the decision. Thus, where 
a municipality has made an unconditional approval, a section 62 appeal is 
completely unavailable to any objector to a decision of a municipality. For 
this reason courts have held that section 62(3) has the effect that the section 
62 appeal mechanism does not satisfy the section 7(2) of PAJA requirement 
that "an internal remedy provided for in any other law [must be] 
exhausted."76 In most instances once a municipality approves a building 
plan the right vests immediately in favour of the applicant, which in terms of 
section 62(3) of the Systems Act would take away the possibility of an 
appeal by any other party that claims to be affected.  
On the contrary, SPLUMA provides that an appeal may be made by "a 
person whose rights are affected by the decision" and goes on to state that 
this includes (i) the person who unsuccessfully applied to the MPT; (ii) the 
municipality itself; and (iii) a person "who may reasonably be expected to 
be affected by the outcome of the land development application 
                                            
74  JDJ Properties CC v Umngeni Local Municipality 2013 2 SA 395 (SCA) para 43. 
Footnote omitted.  
75  Municipality of the City of Cape Town v Reader 2009 1 SA 555 (SCA) paras 31-35. 
76  Municipality of the City of Cape Town v Reader 2009 1 SA 555 (SCA) paras 31-35. 
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proceedings."77 The latter includes interested third parties who were not 
party to the application that was considered and decided upon by the MPT. 
For the purposes of this article, we will call this a wide appeal. It should be 
noted that section 51(5) provides restrictions on third parties making 
appeals by stating that such a third party must have "a pecuniary or 
proprietary interest". Effectively the person must have a financial interest in 
the matter or must have a right over the property — such as ownership of 
the property. 
6.3 Who is the appeal authority? 
As explained above in the discussion of the CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v 
Chairman of the NBR Review Board judgment, the appeal authority under 
section 9 of the NBR Act was a Review Board made up of a chairperson 
(appointed by the Minister of Trade and Industry) and two other members 
appointed by the chairperson. What is clear is that a municipality had no 
control or influence in appointing any of the members of the Review Board. 
This was held by the Constitutional Court to be unconstitutional for violating 
the autonomy of the local sphere of government. 
Under section 62 of the Systems Act, the make-up of the appeal authority 
depends on the identity of the initial decision-maker. Where the initial 
decision-maker was a staff member, the municipal manager is the appeal 
authority. Where the initial decision-maker was the municipal manager, the 
executive committee or executive mayor (or, if the municipality does not 
have an executive committee or executive mayor, the municipal council) is 
the appeal authority. Where the initial decision-maker was "a political 
structure or political office bearer, or a councillor", the appeal authority is the 
municipal council or a committee of members of the municipal council.78 It 
follows that where the decision was made by the entire municipal council 
there cannot be an appeal authority as the municipal council is the highest 
decision-making body in a municipality. It is in this context that the 
Constitutional Court in CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR 
Review Board held that section 62 of the Systems Act was not suitable as 
an appeal mechanism for decisions on building plans made by "a local 
authority" (as the power of the local authority effectively vests in the 
municipal council). The Court said that "if section 62 were to apply, a 
                                            
77  Section 51(4) of SPLUMA. 
78  Section 62(4) of the Systems Act. 
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municipality would sit on appeal against its own decision [and that] this 
would be an untenable situation."79 
In the case of SPLUMA the appeal authority is "the executive authority of 
the municipality." The person or body on whom the executive authority of a 
municipality is conferred depends on the type of the municipality.80 In a 
typical metropolitan municipality, this includes the mayor and the members 
of the mayoral committee (MMCs). What is important is that SPLUMA 
expressly provides that the municipal council may grant the power to decide 
appeals to a body or institution outside of the municipality in the place of the 
executive authority.81 In our view, such a body could be one that 
municipalities are required to be established in terms of national or 
provincial legislation, as long as they retain the powers to appoint relevant 
panel members. National or provincial legislation can only set minimum 
norms and standards on how municipalities should set up such appeal 
bodies.82 There does not seem to be a restriction on the executive 
authority’s delegating this power to officials in the employ of the municipality 
or even to contracted experts.83 Heeding this possibility, some 
municipalities have set up appeal authorities made up of a panel constituted 
of a combination of officials, external experts and even councillors. For 
example, section 98 of the City of Ekurhuleni Metropolitan Municipality's 
Spatial Planning and Land Use Management By-Law permits the Municipal 
Council to set up an appeal authority consisting of at least 11 members 
made up of three officials employed by the Municipality, three persons not 
employed by the Municipality or any organ of state, two officials employed 
                                            
79  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 41. 
80  Section 51(2) of SPLUMA. 
81  Section 51(6) of SPLUMA. See further ss 8 to 10 of the Local Government: Municipal 
Structures Act 117 of 1998. 
82  Indeed, reg 20(b) of the Regulations in terms of SPLUMA (GN R239 in GG 38594 of 
23 March 2015 (SPLUMA Regulations)) contemplates that a municipality is entitled 
to authorise a body outside of the municipality to assume the obligations of an appeal 
authority. 
83  Section 56 of SPLUMA dealing with delegation powers provides that: 
"Any power, except the power to make regulations and the power to determine land 
use and land development applications as contemplated in section 35, conferred in 
this Act upon a Minister, a Premier or a municipality, may, in general or in cases of 
a particular nature, be delegated by the person or body entrusted with that power to 
a political office holder or an official in the employ or service of the relevant sphere 
of government: Provided that any such delegation must be in writing and must 
specify full particulars and the limitations of such a delegation." 
The exception above does not apply to s 51 of SPLUMA. Reg 20(d) of the SPLUMA 
Regulations reads that the executive authority may delegate its authority to hear 
appeals to "an official or a panel of officials as contemplated in section 56 of the Act". 
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by any organ of state in the national or provincial sphere of government, and 
six councillors of the Municipality. 
6.4 Overlaps in internal appeals provided for in more than one law 
Section 62 of the Systems Act anticipates that the legislature may create 
specific internal appeal procedures for specific areas, and thus states that 
"[t]he provisions of this section do not detract from any appropriate appeal 
procedure provided for in any other applicable law."84 The effect is that 
where legislation of greater specificity than the Systems Act provides for an 
internal appeal process, that process must be used to the exclusion of 
section 62 of the Systems Act. Indeed, in the case of decisions on municipal 
planning under SPLUMA, internal appeals may be dealt with only in terms 
of that Act.85 It follows as well that the internal appeal process that existed 
in section 9 of the NBR Act [prior to the finding of unconstitutionality] applied 
to the exclusion of section 62 of the Systems Act. Consequently, should the 
legislature enact a new internal appeal process under the NBR Act in the 
place of section 9, that internal appeal mechanism will apply to the exclusion 
of section 62 of the Systems Act. 
7 Discussion and way forward 
What is left to canvas is an analysis of what the current position is and what 
the options for the future of the regime are. What we find obvious is that the 
NBR Act, which preceded the Constitution by almost two decades, is 
certainly outdated and is not clearly aligned with the newly established 
constitutional powers and functions of local government. The fact that the 
approval of rezoning and township development applications was 
overhauled in the development of SPLUMA is an indication that the approval 
of building plans ought to be overhauled as well, especially since building 
regulation is considered an aspect of broader planning law. It will certainly 
not be surprising if the entire NBR Act is overhauled in the near future. 
7.1 Where are we now? 
The Constitutional Court in CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the 
NBR Review Board ordered that "section 9 of the [NBR Act] is invalid, to the 
extent that it empowers the [Review Board] to exercise appellate powers 
                                            
84  Section 62(6) of the Systems Act. 
85  In fact s 51 of SPLUMA provides that "[n]o appeal in respect of a decision taken in 
terms of or pursuant to [SPLUMA] may be lodged in terms of section 62 of the 
Municipal Systems Act." Thus SPLUMA expressly excludes the application of s 62 
of the Systems Act. 
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over decisions of a municipality." It also ordered that the declaration of 
invalidity will operate prospectively from the date of the order. The Review 
Board was ordered to finalise without delay all appeals lodged with it before 
the date of the order. The order of the Court clearly indicated that, but for 
pre-existing appeals, the mandate of the Review Board was to cease 
immediately. However, the Court did not order Parliament to repair the 
defects in the NBR Act as was the case in Johannesburg Metropolitan 
Municipality v Gauteng Development Tribunal, and did not decide on what 
is the appropriate internal appeal mechanism in respect of decisions under 
the NBR Act. The only guidance provided was that an appellate body in 
such decisions cannot be one established by and operated by the national 
or provincial spheres of government where local government has neither a 
say nor a choice. The Court also correctly averred that the appeal process 
provided for in section 62 of the Systems Act was not suited to internal 
appeals for decisions made under the NBR Act.86 
The Court’s not ordering Parliament to fix the defects in section 9 of the 
NBR Act is indicative that it was of the view that national legislation 
regulating internal appeals for decisions made under the NBR Act was not 
a necessity. This view is correct. As indicated above, in South Africa "there 
is no right to an internal remedy nor is there an obligation on an 
administrative body to apply an internal remedy where there is no specific 
law giving internal remedial power to that administrative body" — only that 
where such law exists the relevant internal appeal mechanism must be 
exhausted.87 The Court clearly left it to Parliament to decide whether or not 
such legislation is desirable. Further, "the law" referred to in PAJA need not 
be national legislation; it includes municipal by-laws. The result of this is 
that, as it stands, in respect of those municipalities which have passed by-
laws regulating internal appeals for decisions under the NBR Act, such 
internal appeal mechanisms must be exhausted in terms of section 7(2)(a) 
of PAJA before review is sought in a court of law. The converse is that in 
respect of those municipalities where there are no by-laws regulating 
internal appeals for decisions made under the NBR Act, it will be deemed 
that there are no internal appeal mechanisms in those municipalities. The 
only recourse available to an unsuccessful applicant would be to approach 
the courts directly for judicial review of the municipality's decision. In the 
light of the advantages of internal appeals discussed above, this is of course 
                                            
86  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board paras 39-41. 
87  Section 7(2)(a) of PAJA. 
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not ideal, as courts would have to adjudicate very technical matters without 
the benefit of ventilation by experts at an internal appeal level. 
The reality explained above is indicative of an environment of incoherence 
and lack of uniformity in respect of appeals against building plan decisions 
in municipalities. Not only will some municipalities not have an internal 
appeal mechanism in place, but municipalities may adopt mechanisms 
which differ from place to place drastically. Although this eventuality may be 
compliant with the constitutional scheme in respect of the autonomy of local 
government, a question arises as to what the impact of such a position is 
on good and effective governance. We have already demonstrated that the 
general regime of internal administrative appeal in South Africa suffers from 
challenges of incoherence and lack of uniformity. Without a general law 
governing internal appeals, it is dependent on context-specific legislation to 
achieve coherence and uniformity. Accordingly, the piecemeal environment 
we find ourselves in at this time appears to have worsened what is already 
an environment of incoherence and lack of uniformity. It is arguable that 
allowing municipalities to develop their own approaches to internal appeals 
on building plan decisions could promote democratic experimentation which 
may result in diverse and unique solutions being organically developed at 
local level. However, there is a balance to be achieved between such noble 
democratic experimentation and the national sphere’s discharging its 
constitutional obligation to guide South Africa's 257 municipalities on the 
topic of building plan decision-making in order to ensure good governance, 
equity, responsiveness, accountability, rule of law and the visionary unity of 
the legal system. We address matter in some detail below. 
7.2 An appropriate internal appeal mechanism for decisions under 
the NBR Act 
In finding an appropriate solution it is trite to consider how the broader 
reading of the Constitution informs the debate. Section 195(1) of the 
Constitution sets out values and principles governing public administration 
in all spheres of government, amongst them: "[s]ervices must be provided 
impartially, fairly and equitably..."; "[p]eople's needs must be responded to"; 
and "[p]ublic administration must be accountable".88 These values are 
consistent with the constitutional values contained in section 1 of the 
Constitution, particularly the rule of law, accountability and responsiveness. 
We believe that ensuring fairness and equity in the treatment of applicants 
for building plan approvals, irrespective of where they are in South Africa, 
                                            
88  Sections 195(1)(e)-(f) of the Constitution. 
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would be served by having a broadly coherent and uniform internal appeal 
regime across municipalities. It is not fair and equitable that there should be 
an internal appeal mechanism in one municipality and none in the next, or 
that one municipality should offer a far more efficient internal appeal 
mechanism than another municipality. Given the advantages of a system of 
internal appeals pointed out in Part 5 of this article, which advantages 
outweigh the disadvantages, a municipality that offers an efficient internal 
appeal mechanism would undoubtedly be a more responsive and 
accountable municipality. Writing about constitutional supremacy and the 
rule of law, Michelman posits that all governance (authorised by law) must 
be aligned with the ideals set out in the Constitution. He asserts that section 
1(c) speaks to the visionary unity of the legal system. Together with other 
constitutional values, section 1(c) provides for legal harmony for South 
Africa, where every aspect of law is illuminated by the same vision.89 
Section 195(3) provides that "[n]ational legislation must ensure the 
promotion of the values and principles listed in subsection (1)." So how can 
national legislation promote the said principles in a manner that does not 
compromise the constitutionally entrenched principle of the autonomy of 
local government? In our view the answer lies in section 155(7) of the 
Constitution: 
The national government, subject to section 44, and the provincial 
governments have the legislative and executive authority to see to the 
effective performance by municipalities of their functions in respect of matters 
listed in Schedules 4 and 5, by regulating the exercise by municipalities of 
their executive authority referred to in section 156(1). 
Read with section 195(3), section 155(7) in our view impels Parliament to 
put in place measures that ensure the coherence and uniformity of internal 
appeal mechanism across municipalities. However, such measures must 
respect local government's constitutional autonomy. The Constitutional 
Court in Habitat Council90 has held that section 155(7) empowers the 
national sphere of government to create "norms and guidelines" for 
application by municipalities in the exercise of their power. These norms 
and guidelines must be aimed at achieving a government espousing the 
values of fairness, equity, responsiveness, accountability and the visionary 
unity of the legal system. 
In our view a good starting point is the internal appeal mechanism 
contemplated in section 51 of SPLUMA. SPLUMA is the overarching 
                                            
89  Michaelman "Rule of Law" 37-38. 
90  Minister of Local Government v The Habitat Council para 22. 
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legislation that guides land use management and development in the 
country. It defines land development as "the erection of buildings or 
structures on land, or the change of use of land, including township 
establishment, the subdivision or consolidation of land or any other 
deviation from the land use or uses permitted in terms of an applicable land 
use scheme". As indicated above, the regulation and approval of building 
plans is a component of general planning law. Looking at the definition of 
land development, one might think that it is broad enough to cover the 
approval of building plans. In our view, when the need arose to overhaul the 
law pertaining to the approval of rezoning and township developments (DFA 
and the aspects of the land use and township development ordinances),91 
it would have been opportune to overhaul the law pertaining to the approval 
of building plans as well. Despite the said broad definition of land 
development, Parliament elected not to include the NBR Act in the overhaul. 
There was no repeal of the NBR Act and thus it remained intact.92 
In our view the success of any internal appeal mechanism depends on who 
the initial decision maker in a municipality is. Non-definition of who the initial-
decision maker is runs the risk that in some municipalities the municipal 
council can be the initial and inevitably the final decision-maker on a building 
plan matter. Indeed this is a notable defect in the NBR Act, which states that 
building plans are approved by a "local authority", which is so broadly 
defined as to include a full municipal council. As indicated in CoJ 
Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board, the 
problem with this is that a municipal council could not sit as an appeal body 
against its own decisions.93 Therefore, in our view, the initial decision-maker 
must be more specifically defined and should not be the municipal council. 
SPLUMA places the power to approve or not approve rezoning and 
township development applications on a Municipal Planning Tribunal (MPT) 
staffed by experts and municipal officials, without interference by councillors 
(politicians).94 This approach also allows for collective decision-making by 
experts and professionals. For the purposes of decisions on building plan, 
the legislature would have the option of prescribing that each municipality 
must set up an MPT-type body to make binding decisions on building plans 
                                            
91  The Transvaal Town-Planning and Townships Ordinance 15 of 1986; the Cape Land 
Use and Planning Ordinance 15 of 1985; the Natal Town Planning Ordinance 27 of 
1949; and the Free State Townships Ordinance 9 of 1969. 
92  We perused explanatory memoranda and minutes of committee meetings in the 
development of SPLUMA, and there was no indication that SPLUMA would regulate 
building plans as well. 
93  CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR Review Board para 42. 
94  Section 36 of SPLUMA. 
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(or even that binding decisions be made by the MPT already set up in terms 
of SPLUMA). Under such a regime building control officers may be retained 
and will continue to make "recommendations", as is currently the case, with 
the exception that the recommendation will no longer be made to the 
"municipality" (which could mean the municipal council) but to an MPT-type 
body. 
Turning to internal appeals, according to section 51(1) of SPLUMA a person 
whose rights are affected by a decision taken by an MPT may lodge a notice 
of appeal against that decision (within 21 days) to the municipal manager, 
who will then submit it to the executive authority of the municipality as the 
appeal authority. The appeal authority is obliged to consider the appeal and 
confirm, vary or revoke the decision. This is where we differ from the 
approach in SPLUMA. In our view the use of municipal executives as the 
appeal authority for land development applications, including for approval of 
building plans, may be problematic due to their limited expertise in the area 
of planning law. As indicated above, one of the core advantages of internal 
appeals is that they provide a platform that allows for the reconsideration of 
decisions that are technical, practical, of a policy nature, and often 
specialised, to be made by experts and people who work on such matters 
more regularly. We believe that Parliament should empower (even compel) 
municipalities to establish their own municipal appeal tribunals staffed by 
appropriately qualified experts who can ensure that norms and standards in 
the National Building Regulations are applied consistently. This approach is 
also in line with the option in section 51(6) of SPLUMA, which empowers 
municipalities to give the appeal power given to executive authorities 
instead to an external expert appeal body. Section 51(6) of SPLUMA 
provides that "[a] municipality may, in place of its executive authority, 
authorise that a body or institution outside of the municipality or in a manner 
regulated in terms of provincial legislation, assume the obligations of an 
appeal authority in terms of this section." As indicated above, this approach 
would allow less-resourced municipalities to still benefit from an expert 
appeal body without the need to procure their own expert panels. 
The approach in SPLUMA is not without cushioning, as the initial decisions 
made by the MPT would have been made by experts and professionals; and 
members of the executive authority could always procure the services and 
advice of experts. Indeed, section 39(1) of SPLUMA empowers the 
executive authority of a municipality to "co-opt, appoint or employ the 
services of technical or other advisers" in the performance of their functions. 
Section 56 also allows executive authorities to delegate their powers to hear 
internal appeals. It could even be argued that this route could be cost-
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effective and ensure expedited outcomes, as municipalities would not have 
to appoint external experts to the appeal body and could just rely on the 
advice of officials in the employ of the municipality. However, in our view, 
this may still lead to incoherencies and lack of uniformity, as inequality of 
resources amongst municipalities may lead to decisions in some 
municipalities being taken without appropriate expertise. The more well-
resourced municipalities may be able to appoint advisers on a matter-by-
matter basis. The same cannot be said of less-resourced municipalities. 
To avert the cost concerns arising from each municipality’s having its own 
appeal body made up of experts (both internal and external), provision could 
be made in national legislation to give municipalities the powers to establish 
a shared appeal body on a voluntary basis. This approach would be in line 
with the duty imposed by the Constitution on national and provincial 
government to see to the effective performance of municipal functions. As 
has already been canvassed above and reiterated below, even SPLUMA is 
not averse to an external body’s being an appeal body of a municipality. 
It is clear from the discussion of the SPLUMA approach that it provides 
options for final decisions on appeals to be made not by the executive 
authority but by experts and professionals either through the delegation of 
power by the executive authority in terms of section 56 or by the 
municipality’s authorising an external body established in terms of national 
or provincial legislation to be the appeal body in the place of the executive 
authority. As laudable as this approach is, the fact that the delegation or 
outsourcing to experts and professionals would be optional in each instance 
would likely result in final arbiters in some municipalities being experts and 
professionals and in others the appellate jurisdiction’s remaining with the 
executive authority (the politicians). In our view, it is within the power of 
Parliament, in setting out norms and guidelines for municipalities, to insist 
that final arbitration be performed largely by experts and professionals and 
not politicians. This would be the best way to advance the ideals of 
coherence, uniformity, equity and good governance promoted in this article. 
This does not mean that the executive authority or councillors would be 
excluded altogether from decision-making. In the first instance, where the 
municipality sets up its own expert appeal body, councillors would be the 
ones appointing members of such an appeal body. In the second instance, 
councillors may still form part of the appeal body. They would just not have 
the exclusive power to make appeal decisions. Indeed, the limitation of the 
involvement of politicians is achieved by section 98 of the City of Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality's Spatial Planning and Land Use Management By-
Law, which permits the Municipal Council to set up an appeal authority 
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consisting of municipal officials, external experts, officials of other organs of 
state and municipal councillors (which may include members of the 
executive authority). However, it is advisable that councillors not be the 
majority of the personnel in any appeal body, since most of them do not 
have the requisite technical expertise. 
It is important to consider what, if anything, of the erstwhile internal appeal 
regime under the NBR Act should be retained by the legislature. Of 
significance about this regime is that appeal decisions were made 
exclusively by appropriately skilled experts who were selected from 
amongst and nominated by industry players. The NCRS played a significant 
role in facilitating the work of the Review Board, including by ensuring that 
appropriate experts were selected. It would be a pity if the infrastructure of 
the NCRS were to be lost. We would suggest that in developing an appeal 
mechanism for decisions under the NBR Act, a role be retained for the 
NCRS. One of the things that could be done by the NCRS to support the 
new internal appeal regime could be maintaining a list of qualified and 
suitable experts from which municipalities would have to select expert 
members of their appeals committees. It could also serve as an advisory 
body to municipalities on matters related to internal appeals for decisions 
about building plans. 
8 Conclusion 
We have sought to provide a comprehensive account of the implications of 
the decision of the Constitutional Court in CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v 
Chairman of the NBR Review Board to declare unconstitutional the internal 
appeal scheme provided in section 9 of the NBR Act on the basis that it 
violates the constitutionally enshrined principle of the autonomy of local 
government. In doing so we have taken the opportunity to demonstrate how 
the erstwhile internal appeal regime under the NBR Act worked, how it fared 
in comparison with other internal appeal mechanisms designed for 
municipal decisions, and the general importance of internal appeals for 
municipalities in the South African context. 
We found that the CoJ Metropolitan Municipality v Chairman of the NBR 
Review Board judgment has left a whopping gap on the topic of where 
prospective appeals ought to be lodged and the nature thereof, the result 
being the potential for incoherence and lack of uniformity in building plan 
decisions, depending on which municipality you are dealing with. Some 
municipalities would have internal appeal mechanisms while others would 
have none at all, or one municipality might offer a far efficient internal appeal 
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mechanism than another. We found this to be inconsistent with principles 
and values enshrined in section 195(1) and section 1 of the Constitution, 
including the rule of law, accountability, responsiveness, impartiality, 
fairness and equity. 
We found that the solution to the said gap lies in a legislative intervention 
by Parliament. It is within Parliament's power, and indeed within its 
constitutional duty to provide for a broadly coherent and uniform internal 
appeal mechanism for decisions about building plans under the NBR Act 
applicable across municipalities whilst respecting and complying with the 
constitutional principle of the autonomy of local government. We found that 
SPLUMA would provide the most appropriate inspiration for a new internal 
appeal regime for decisions about building plan. At the heart of the 
necessary reform is the need for decisions, including decisions on appeal, 
to be made by professionals with expertise at least in the legal, construction 
and engineering environments. This could be achieved by a legislative 
enactment that required municipalities to establish expert internal appeal 
bodies made up of municipal officials, external experts and even municipal 
councillors — as long as the latter are not in the majority in any appeal body. 
Such a model has already been adopted by the City of Ekurhuleni 
Metropolitan Municipality in section 98 of its Spatial Planning and Land Use 
Management By-Law in respect of municipal planning decisions. To provide 
for municipalities who may not have the capacity to establish their own 
expert appeal bodies, national legislation could make provision for them to 
establish a shared appeal authority. 
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